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Abstract
Recent advances in the political economy literature suggests that
constitutional arrangements determine a wide range of economic pol-
icy outcomes. In particular, it is argued that di¤erent forms of govern-
ment (presidential versus parliamentary) induce more or less growth
promotingpolicies. However, e¤ects on long run growth have proved
harder to identify. We exploit the fact that natural resources are ran-
domly distributed to identify di¤erences in the long-term performance
of economies with di¤erent constitutional forms. Existing theory sug-
gests that the presence of vast natural resources should a¤ect growth
di¤erently in countries with di¤erent constitutional designs. Empiri-
cally we nd strong support for this hypothesis constitutions indeed
seem to matter for how natural resource abundance a¤ects long run
growth. In fact, the form of government matters more than democratic
rule. We also nd interaction e¤ects of electoral rules (majority ver-
sus proportional voting) and resource abundance on growth, although
these e¤ects are less clear-cut and less robust.
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1 Introduction
Recent contributions to the political economy literature demonstrate sys-
tematic e¤ects of constitutional features, such as the electoral rules and the
rules for legislation, on a wide range of economic policy outcomes, particu-
larly scal policy and corruption (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, henceforth
PT, 2003). Causal e¤ects of constitutions on policies that are important
for long run economic performance (so-called growth promoting structural
policies) have been harder to identify. Using within-country variation and
instrumenting for constitutional features, Persson (2005) shows that reforms
from non-democracy or presidential democracy into parliamentary democ-
racy leads to more growth promoting trade and regulation policies. In turn,
better structural policies has been shown to lead to higher long term
growth (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2001; replicated by Persson,
2005).1 There are, however, no patterns in the data suggesting any clear
direct e¤ects of constitutions on long term performance.
We suggest an indirect approach to test whether di¤erent constitutional
forms foster di¤erent growth promoting policies. Exploiting the fact that
natural resources are randomly distributed among countries provides us with
a quasi-natural experiment designed to measure and compare di¤erences in
performance among countries with di¤erent types of constitutions.2 We ar-
gue that if economic policies are determined by the constitutional arrange-
ments we might expect countries with di¤erent constitutional arrangements
to react di¤erently to exogenous factors such as resource endowments. In
particular, if natural resource abundance a¤ects growth promoting policies
di¤erently in countries with di¤erent constitutional forms, this will be re-
ected in di¤erences in long run growth.3
Using a cross-country sample of up to 90 countries from all continents, we
empirically investigate whether di¤erent forms of government and electoral
systems a¤ect the impact of natural resource wealth on long-term economic
performance. By including democracies as well as nondemocratic regimes
in the sample, we can separate the e¤ects of democratic rule as such, from
the e¤ects of constitutional form. We nd strong evidence in favour of the
hypothesis that constitutions matter for the resource curse. The particular
forms of democracy matter even more than democratic rule in itself. Among
democracies, presidential regimes su¤er from the resource curse but parlia-
1The term structural policies in the literature of Persson and Tabellini (PT, 2003;
Persson 2005) loosely corresponds to what Acemoglu et al., 2001 refer to as economic
institutionse.g., trade and regulation policies. See Persson (2005) for a further discussion.
2A vast literature on the so-called resource curse (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997a,
1997b, 2001) shows that, on average, resource dependent economies have experienced lower
average growth rates than countries less dependent on income from natural resources.
3Thus, the identifying assumptions would be that economic (budgetary) shocks only
a¤ects long term growth through their e¤ects on economic policies, and that economic
policies are determined by specic constitutional arrangements.
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mentary regimes do not. In fact, it seems that the overall resource curse iden-
tied by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a, 1997b, 2001), henceforth SW, is
mainly driven by presidential countries and nondemocratic regimes.4 These
results are robust to di¤erent sample selections (e.g., inclusion/exclusion of
non-democracies in the sample), inclusion of geographical and colonial dum-
mies, robust estimation procedures (the least absolute deviation regression
method and the reweighted least squares regression method), inference from
di¤erent growth periods, using di¤erent model specications, and using in-
strumental variable methods, in which settler mortality is used to instrument
constitutional form (as in Persson, 2005). Regarding electoral rules, we nd
suggestive evidence that countries with a proportional electoral formula are
more prone to the resource curse than are countries with a majoritarian
voting rule.
In section 2.1, we briey review the literature on the resource curse. We
then suggest in section 2.2 an intuitive and verbally formulated theoretical
synthesis of the literature on the resource curse and of the literature on the
economic e¤ect of constitutions. This discussion will provide the basis for
the hypotheses we take to the data. After these preliminaries, we formulate
an empirical growth model in section 3. The empirical results are presented
and discussed in section 4. Finally, in section 5, we sum up and conclude.
2 Theoretical preliminaries
2.1 The resource curse literature
The literature on the resource curse is primarily interested in explaining the
paradoxical empirical pattern that countries rich in natural resources seem
to be outperformed by countries with less, or no, natural resources in the
long run (SW, 1995; 1997a; 1997b; 2001). The seminal theoretical literature
on the resource curse focuses on the structural mechanisms of the so-called
Dutch disease. The Dutch disease hypothesis suggests that abundance in
natural resources induce factors of production to shift out of the sectors
that are most important for growth so that long run economic development
su¤ers (e.g., Matsuyama, 1992; SW, 1999; Torvik, 2001). Subsequently, the
rent-seeking approach has gained increased attention. Rent-seeking models
are based on the assumption that resource rents can be appropriated by
groups or individual economic agents (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell
and Lane, 1999; Torvik, 2002.). In these models economic performance is
hurt because rent-seeking behavior implies that productive resources are
allocated ine¢ ciently.
It now appears that there is little support for the Dutch disease explana-
4 In some regressions, we include exactly the same countries as SW (1995, 1997a), in
order to compare our results with those of the previous literature.
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tion, as it fails explain the diverging experience of di¤erent economies (Bulte
et al., 2004). An overview of di¤erent case studies in Auty (2001) demon-
strates the diversity of di¤erent countries experience. This critique also
applies for the rent-seeking literature, with the exception of Mehlum et al.
(2006) who show that the e¤ect of natural resources on aggregate production
may depend on the quality of institutions. Mehlum et al. demonstrates the
implication of their theory by presenting a simple empirical growth study,
based on the empirical studies by SW, suggesting that the quality of institu-
tions indeed seems to be decisive for the resource curse. These ndings are
supported by Boschini et al., (2004) who show that the impact of natural
resources on economic growth is non-monotonic in institutional quality.
2.2 Constitutions, structural policies and the resource curse
The resource curse literature has indeed come a long way in establishing
signicant interactions e¤ects of institutional quality and natural resource
abundance on long-term economic performance. However, using measures
of institutional quality, as in Boschini et al., (2004) and in Mehlum et al.
(2006), in cross-country growth regressions is problematic for, at least, two
reasons. First, institutional performance indicators are likely to be endoge-
nous to growth, resulting in serious econometric problems of simultaneity.5
Second, it is unclear which aspects of institutional performance that are
important for economic growth. By instrumenting for institutional quality
Boschini et al., (2004) propose a way around the rst problem. The second
problem, however, remains unsolved. We argue that using measures of insti-
tutional design, as opposed to measures of performance, is a step in the right
direction. There are several reasons for this. First, the literature on the eco-
nomic e¤ect of constitutions shows that institutional design is a signicant
determinant of institutional performance (PT, 2003). Second, institutional
designs rarely change, a property that political scientists often refer to as an
iron law. This property of inertia is useful because it provides the analy-
sis with a source of cross-country variation that is less sensitive to economic
performance. The properties of constitutions also provides a foundation for
a better understanding of which aspects of institutions that are most essen-
tial to growth, and, as we investigate, which aspect of institutional design
that interacts with natural resource abundance to a¤ect long-term economic
growth.
Why would we expect to observe interaction e¤ects between institutional
design and natural resource abundance on economic growth? The remainder
of this section propose an intuitive and non-technical answer to this question.
5The measures of institutional quality that are applied in the resource curse literature
are subjecive indicators provided by Political Risk Services, Corruption Perceptions, and
the World Bank Governance Indicators. Such indexes are indeed likely to be endogenous
to economic development.
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This will constitute the main motivation of this paper, and provide the
basis for the hypotheses that we take to the data. In short, we argue that;
as di¤erent institutional designs a¤ect policymakersincentives di¤erently,
so as to produce di¤erent policy outcomes that in turn a¤ect long-term
growth, incentives are also likely to be a¤ected by the total amounts of rents
available to the politicians. The rents available are in turn positively related
to the abundance of natural resources. Thus, it is possible that natural
resource abundance has a di¤erent impact on the policies, and consequently
on the long-term growth, of countries with di¤erent institutional design. Our
approach is thus a broad one we simply explore some general, reduced-
form empirical patterns that has not yet been explored. We do not consider
the specic economic mechanisms at work.
An important aspect of a countrys institutional arrangements is the
design of the constitution. The constitution denes the formal rules of the
political game, where the playersare politicians, parties and voters. Two
of the most fundamental sets of rules are the electoral rules and the rules
for legislation (PT, 2003). The comparative politics tradition in political
science has focused on the political consequences of alternative constitutions.
A basic insight from this research is that alternative constitutional features
incorporate di¤erent combinations of two desirable attributes of a political
system: accountability and representativeness (PT, 2003). The trade-o¤
between accountability and representativeness in the electoral rules and in
the forms of government are likely to be reected in actual policy outcomes.
Recent developments in the political economy literature have exploited these
insights to analyze how the design of the constitution shapes economic scal
policy outcomes. As we investigate long-term trends we are not primarily
interested in specic policies. It may however be instructive for the line of
argument to go through some of the basic insights and predictions from this
literature.
One typical prediction of the literature on constitutions is that majority
voting, combining small voting districts with plurality rule, tends to favor
narrow spending programs. Transfers directed to pivotal minorities are more
e¤ective in winning elections than implementing broader scal programs un-
der majoritarian systems. In the extreme case, with single-member districts,
a winner-takes-all system and a plurality rule, a party needs only 25 percent
of the national vote to win. By contrast, proportional representation based
on large electoral districts is predicted to favor broader spending programs.
The reason for this is that a party, or a politician, needs to maximize the
total vote share to win the election, thus, discretionary pork barreling
programs are ine¤ective. In addition, some of the literature predicts that
majoritarian systems are associated with smaller overall government spend-
ing and taxes (PT, 2003).6
6 In Milesi-Ferretti et :al :; (2002) the reason for this association is a smaller district size,
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When it comes to the legislative rules, presidential forms of government
should be associated with less rent extraction and lower taxation than par-
liamentary forms of government because of the separation of powers argu-
ment. One intuition behind the rent extraction argument is that separation
of powers leads to checks and balances among di¤erent o¢ ces and thereby
constrain politicians from abusing their positions. In addition, since stronger
accountability also restrains politicians from raising taxes, one would expect
presidential regimes to be associated with lower overall taxation and govern-
ment spending (Persson, Roland and Tabellini,1997, 2000).7 According to
the condence requirement argument, presidential regimes are expected to
implement more targeted programs at the expense of broad overall spending
programs. In parliamentary regimes, the fear of government crises creates
strong incentives to maintain party discipline (see, e.g., Shugart and Carey,
1992; Huber, 1996). Building on this idea, Persson, Roland and Tabellini,
(2000) show that parliamentary governments pursue the joint interests of
their voters and thus optimally creates broad spending programs. By con-
trast, presidential regimes, which are not constrained by a condence re-
quirement, are not dependent on a stable majority among the legislators
and use the agenda setting powers to set di¤erent minorities against each
other on various aspects of the legislative agenda. As a result, the model
predicts the allocation of spending to target powerful minorities within the
constituencies of powerful o¢ ceholders. There is more to the dynamics of
this class of models than we have space for in this paper; PT (2000, 2003)
provide a detailed review of the literature of the economic e¤ects of consti-
tutions. PT (2003) also present extensive empirical research on whether the
theoretical predictions of the political economy literature are supported by
the data.8
Persson (2005) argues that if constitutions do shape scal policy and
other economic and institutional features, they are likely to be reected also
in the structural policies fostering economic development, including regu-
lations to preserve property rights and non-protectionistic trade policies.
Hence, the specic political arrangements the form of democracy, rather
wheras in Austen-Smith (2000) the reason is plurality rule.
7 In Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997, 2000), the distinction between these forms
of government centers on the rules for legislative bargaining. The bargaining between
di¤erent legislative coalitions, inherent in parliamentary democracies, is disciplined by the
threat of a government crisis. As such a crisis would result in the loss of valuable agenda-
setting powers for the government, party discipline and stable legislative coalitions are
promoted. In a presidential system, the executive cannot be brought down by the legis-
lator, but is directly accountable to the voters. Thus, legislators have weaker incentives
to stick together and vote on party or coalition lines. These di¤erences create larger
overall and broader spending programs in parliamentary regimes compared to presidential
regimes.
8For a brief overview of this literatures main predictions and ndings, see Persson
(2002).
6
than democratic rule per se may be one of the missing links between his-
tory, current policy and economic development. If the regulation of property
rights and the trade regime are important for economic development, one
would expect these regulations to be more conducive to growth when they
apply to broad population groups rather than to small privileged groups.
Another insight from the existing literature is that systematic e¤ects of al-
ternative democratic arrangements should be incorporated in many, not just
single policy programs. Perssons analysis suggests that introducing parlia-
mentary democracy in a previously nondemocratic regime or, equivalently,
in a presidential democracy, improves structural policy so as to raise long-run
productivity by almost 50%. At a minimum, these estimates indicate that
the form of democracy is systematically correlated with structural policies.
In several recent papers, constitutions have been shown to inuence
corruption. Gerring and Thacker (2004) examine the impact of territor-
ial sovereignty (unitary or federal) and the composition of the executive
(parliamentary or presidential) on levels of perceived political corruption.
They nd evidence indicating that parliamentary forms of government help
reduce corruption. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) show that propor-
tional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political
rent seeking than are plurality systems. They also examine the interaction
between electoral rules and presidentialism, and nd that PR systems, par-
ticularly when combined with presidentialism, are associated with higher
levels of corrupt political rent seeking. Empirically, their results conrm
PTs basic ndings that proportional elections are associated with higher
corruption levels, but contradict PTs ndings on presidential systems.
Given all these ndings, it is reasonable to ask whether similar patterns
can be found for the growth e¤ect of the resource endowment. If the electoral
system and the form of government shape a countrys structural policies and
the level of corruption, it is plausible that the electoral system and the form
of government also a¤ect the way countries respond to resource windfalls. A
countrys resource endowment might have important implications for politi-
ciansopportunities to design policy. A larger government budget provides
politicians with more resources which can be used to inuence the outcome
of elections and may also raise the value of being in power, which may, in
turn, amplify the political incentives to distribute resources and political
favors in an ine¢ cient manner. Mehlum et al. (2006) assert that the vari-
ance of growth performance of resource-rich countries is primarily a result
of how resource rents are distributed through institutional arrangements. If
this is the case, and given that di¤erent forms of government create di¤er-
ent incentives for distributing political favors, one would expect countries
with di¤erent constitutions to respond di¤erently to resource booms. Based
on the insights from the theoretical literature, the notion that presidential
systems to a larger degree direct political favors towards powerful minori-
ties whereas structural programs in parliamentary systems targets broader
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measures, and based on empirical insights, suggesting that there is less cor-
ruption in parliamentary democracies, we might expect resource abundant
parliamentary regimes to perform better in the long run than resource abun-
dant presidential regimes.
3 Data and Econometric Model
We construct two data sets based on di¤erent data sources, one covering the
period 19701990, the second covering the period 19902000. Our 19701990
data set includes information on 90 countries.9 In this data set countries are
classied as democratic or nondemocratic regimes on the basis of the den-
ition used by PT (2003). Countries with an average value of less than 5 for
the Gastil Index for the period 19721990 (corresponding to partly free,
according to the Freedom House) are treated as democracies.10 We further
separate our democracies into presidential democracies and parliamentary
democracies, and into majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Our
constitutional variables are primarily from PT (2003) and Persson (2005).
PT (2003) classify regimes as presidential if the condence of the assembly
is not needed for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president
is not the chief executive, or if there is no elected president). On the basis of
this denition, most semipresidential and premier-presidential systems are
classied as parliamentary regimes. PT (2003) classify regimes as majoritar-
ian if all of the lower house is elected under plurality rule. Only legislative
elections (for the lower house) are considered. Persson (2005) lists reform
episodes, that is, exits from and entries into di¤erent forms of democracy
for the period 1962-1998. We combine these two sources in order to classify
countries according to their form of government and electoral system in 1970
(see Appendix 1 for details).
Our 19902000 data set includes information on 61 democracies.11 This
data set is also separated into presidential regimes and parliamentary regimes,
and into majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. Our constitutional
variables are identical to PTs (2003) classication (See PT (2003) for a pre-
9These are the countries included in SWs (1997a) main sample, with the exception of
Hong Kong which is not classied in the Gastil Index (a democracy index) for the whole
sample period (1970-1990).
10For a precise denition, consult: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/>.
Note, however, that all our main ndings are robust to a narrower categorization (i.e.,
when countries with a Gastil Index of < 3.5 are treated as democracies), although this
respecication reduces the number of democracies in the sample. Thus, the democracy
threshold is not critical for estimating the economic e¤ect of constitutions.
11To dene democracy in the 19902000 data set, we rely on PT (2003). PT (2003)
include a country as democracy if the GASTIL score is lower than an average of 5 for the
19901998 period. This rule permits 85 countries to be classied as democracies in PT
(2003). We are able to utalize 61 out of these 85 countries due missing data on some of
the relevant variables.
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cise denition).
To compare our ndings with the inuential contributions of SW, and
in particular SW (1995,1997a), we mainly use their model specication and
control variables. SW (2001) show that their previous results (1995, 1997a)
are robust to conditioning on previous growth rates rather than levels. For
simplicity, we condition on initial levels in our specications. Thus, we
expect average (log of) economic growth in country i between time t = 0
and time t = T (in this case 19701990 or 19902000), 1t
 
yiT   yi0

, to be
determined to (the log of) initial income, yi0, and a vector of country specic
structural characteristics, Zi, as follows.
1
t
 
yiT   yi0

= 0 + 1y
i
0 + Z
i + ui (1)
SW (1995, 1997a) suggest that that initial natural resource abundance
should be included in Zi. Given the recent contributions in the political
economy literature relating structural (growth promoting) policies to di¤er-
ent constitutional arrangements, we investigate whether constitutional fea-
tures are incorporated in Zi as well. More importantly, however, we check
whether there are any interaction e¤ects between constitutional arrange-
ments and natural resource abundance. If constitutional arrangements af-
fect structural policies, as predicted by the political economy literature,
and structural policies matter for how countries deal with natural resource
wealth, one would expect to observe such interaction e¤ects in the data.
In particular, presidential regimes are expected to be associated with worse
structural policies, in terms of growth, than parliamentary regimes. Thus,
we expect presidential regimes with abundant natural resources to grow
more slowly than resource abundant parliamentary regimes.
In our model, the vector of control variables comprises constitutional
dummies and their interaction with natural resource abundance, in addition
to the controls in SWs most robust specications. In particular, we include
dummies for the form of government (presidential versus parliamentary)
and electoral rules (majoritarian versus proportional electoral system). In
addition, we control for geographic location (continent), colonial history,
and the most robust signicant determinants of growth according to Sala-i-
Martin (1997). In the 19902000 data set we construct variables using the
same denitions as SW (1997a), but for di¤erent time periods.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows the plot of average annual economic growth from 1970 to
1990 against resource abundance separately for parliamentary democracies
and presidential democracies.
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Figure 1
Growth 1970 1990 in Parliamentary democracies
Growth 1970 - 1990 in Presidential Democracies
The group of parliamentary democracies comprises 33 countries, two
of which are in the top 10 percent of natural resource abundant countries
and six of which are in the bottom 10 percent. The group of presidential
democracies comprises 25 countries, two of which are located in the top 10
percent of natural resource abundant countries and two of which are in the
bottom 10 percent. Figure 1 suggests a negative relationship between initial
natural resource abundance and growth only among presidential democracies
parliamentary democracies seem to avoid the curse.
In our sample, the measure of initial resource abundance, which is the
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ratio of primary exports to GDP in 1970, ranges from 0.6% to 54%. We
nd all regime types represented among both resource rich countries and re-
source poor countries. Among the one-third of the countries with the most
abundant natural resources, there are 6 parliamentary democracies, 9 pres-
idential democracies and 15 nondemocratic regimes. Among the one-third
of the countries least abundant in natural resources, there are 18 parliamen-
tary democracies, 7 presidential democracies and 5 nondemocratic regimes.
In the middle group, we nd 9 parliamentary democracies, 9 presidential
democracies and 12 nondemocratic regimes. Thus, there seems to be su¢ -
cient variation in resource abundance among all three categories of countries
for statistical inference to be reliable.
To investigate whether this pattern holds when controlling for other fac-
tors that have been found to be important for growth, we use alternative
model specications. We begin by replicating the regression results of the
main model specication in SW (1997a). SW exclude four outliers when es-
timating their main model specication. These countries are deemed to be
outliers according to the procedure suggested by Belsley et al., (1980). SW
identify the four outliers regressing growth only on initial natural resource
abundance and on the average degree of openness between 1970-1990. Note
that the same countries will not necessarily be identied as outliers when ad-
ditional controls for constitutional classication and its interaction with nat-
ural resource abundance are included. To estimate di¤erent specications of
the model on a consistent sample we address the problem of possible outliers
by applying two di¤erent robust estimation techniques (discussed below).
Table 1, column (1), replicates the results in SW (1997a), without ex-
cluding outliers. Our results are consistent with those of SW in relation to
convergence, and the e¤ects on growth of openness, the rule of law index,
investment and natural resource abundance. On average, countries that
where abundant in natural resources 1970 experienced lower growth in the
following two decades, with an estimated coe¢ cient of -8.17 and a t-statistic
of -6.71. The cross-country mean of natural resource abundance in our data
is 0.13 with a standard deviation of 0.10.12 The estimates in column (1)
imply that a 10 percentage point increase (which corresponds to an increase
of one standard deviation) in the ratio of exports of natural resources to
GNP in 1970 is associated with a reduction in annual average growth the
two following decades of 0.82 percentage points ( 8:17  0:10 =  0:82).
In column (2), we include dummies for the form of government (with
the excluded category being parliamentary democracy). Including controls
for the type of government (presidential democracy, parliamentary democ-
racy and nondemocratic regime) does not change the e¤ects of convergence,
openness, rule of law, investment and natural resource abundance. Presiden-
12Thus, on average, about 13 percent of the gross national income (GNI) of the countries
in the sample stems from exporting primary products.
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tial democracies are associated with lower growth than are parliamentary
democracies, given an estimated coe¢ cient of -0.57 and a t-statistic of -1.84
(which implies a signicance level of 7 percent).
So far, our estimates have added little to SWs ndings. Column (3),
however, provides new insights into the resource curse. In this regression,
we include interaction terms between the form of government and resource
abundance. The direct e¤ect of resource abundance is no longer statisti-
cally or economically signicant. This indicates that there is no signicant
resource curse in parliamentary democracies (our excluded category). Not
surprisingly, nondemocratic regimes abundant in natural resources perform
worse than resource abundant parliamentary democracies, with an estimated
interaction coe¢ cient of -6.21 and a t-statistic of -1.98. Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, the performance of natural resource abundant presidential democ-
racies is even worse. Comparing natural resource abundant democracies,
presidential democracies perform much worse than parliamentary democra-
cies, with an estimated interaction coe¢ cient of -7.85 and a t-statistic of
-2.69. Thus, among presidential democracies and nondemocratic regimes,
higher natural resource abundance in 1970 is associated with lower growth
in the following two decades, whereas, for parliamentary democracies, higher
natural resource abundance in 1970 does not signicantly a¤ect subsequent
growth. Finally, note that allowing interaction e¤ects eliminate the separate
e¤ect of form of government.
In Table 2, we run the same regressions but, this time, nondemocratic
regimes are excluded from the sample. Column (1) exhibits the same quali-
tative results relating to convergence (initial income), natural resource abun-
dance, openness, investment, the rule of law, and changes in the external
terms of trade. This indicates that the negative correlation between resource
abundance and growth also applies among democracies. As in Table 1, in-
cluding controls for the form of government does not signicantly change the
estimated e¤ects of any of the other explanatory variables. In column (3),
we include interaction terms between the form of government and resource
abundance. Again, the direct e¤ect of resource abundance is no longer
signicant, hence there is no resource curse in parliamentary democracies
(our excluded category). Among resource abundant democracies, presiden-
tial regimes perform much worse than parliamentary regimes, with a highly
signicant estimated interaction coe¢ cient of -8.02 (for which the level of
signicance is 0.7 percent).
One objection to our interpretation of the results, namely that the re-
source curse seems to be determined by constitutional features, might be
that constitutional classications are merely proxies for geographic location
and/or colonial history, which then are the real determinants of the curse.
For example, the widespread use of presidentialism in the Americas has led
political scientists to dub the Americas as the continent of presidentialism.
We investigated this objection by including dummy variables for previous
12
colonial rulers, continent and added interaction terms with resource abun-
dance to see if this could explain the diverging growth performance among
resource rich countries. Including these controls indicates that the resource
curse occurs regardless of colonial history and location (table not shown).
In Table 3, we include additional controls to check whether our previous
ndings are robust to the inclusion of dummies for previous colonial rule
and continent. The patterns evident in Tables 1 and 2 are conrmed. Presi-
dential regimes su¤er the most from being rich in natural resources, relative
to both parliamentary democracies and nondemocratic regimes.
A potential limitation of OLS estimators in general is that they may
be highly inuenced by outliers located at leverage points. This limitation
applies particularly in small samples. To make sure that our results are
not driven by outliers, we reran our regressions by using two alternative
estimation methods that are robust to the presence of outliers. First, we
used LAD regression, which is a special case of quantile regression, or more
specically, median regression (table not shown).13 Minimizing the sum of
absolute deviations makes the regression less sensitive to outliers than does
minimizing the squared deviations. Thus, LAD estimates represent the bulk
of the observations better than OLS estimates, particularly in small samples.
Second, we used a reweighted least squares technique (table not shown).
Reweighted least squares is recommended by Rosseeuw and Leroy (1987),
among others. Under this procedure OLS regression is applied, gross out-
liers are excluded and, then, observations with large residuals are iteratively
downweighted.14 Outliers are dropped if Cooks distance measure exceeds
unity. On this criterion, no outliers were dropped in our regressions. Both
estimation procedures suggest that outlying observations do not materially
a¤ect our results. The estimated coe¢ cients and their p-values are similar
to the OLS estimates. If anything, the e¤ects appear stronger15.
Up to this point, our analysis suggests that di¤erent regime types gener-
ate di¤erent growth e¤ects of natural resource abundance. In particular, we
have found that parliamentary democracies seem to respond di¤erently to
their resource endowments than do other countries. For the whole sample,
the variables for initial income, natural resource abundance, openness and
the investment rate have the most explanatory power for growth. A related
13See, e.g., Greene (2003) for an introduction to LAD estimation and for a small sample
Monte Carlo study showing the advantages of LAD estimation over OLS in the presence
of outliers.
14This technique corresponds to the rreg command in STATA. The actual algorithm
may be found in the STATA (2003) manual.
15The quantile regression result indicate that the interaction term between pres and
resource abundance is -8.385, wheras the robust regression result indicate an interaction
term of -8.637 (both statistically signicant at 1%). When only democrasies are included,
the interaction term ranges from -7.488 (quantile regression) to -6.949 (robust regression),
again signicant at 1%. When interaction terms are included, the direct e¤ect of resource
abundance do not turn out signicant in neither the quantile or the robust regressions.
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question is whether the e¤ects of these other variables also di¤er system-
atically between parliamentary democracies and other regime types. The
summary statistics in Table A2 indicate that the three forms of government
have di¤erent average values for the important determinants of growth. Ini-
tial income levels are higher in parliamentary democracies than in the other
two regimes. The overall sample mean for this variable is 8.31 with a stan-
dard deviation of 0.90. This indicates that the deviation in the regime-type
mean is less than one standard deviation of the overall sample mean for all
three categories. The measure of natural resource abundance is also lower in
parliamentary democracies than in the other two regimes. The overall sam-
ple mean of natural resource abundance is 0.13 with a standard deviation of
0.10. Hence, the deviation in the regime-type mean is less than one standard
deviation of the overall sample mean for all three categories. Presidential
democracies and nondemocratic regimes are less open than parliamentary
democracies and the investment rate is lower but, again, the di¤erence from
the overall sample mean is less than one standard deviation.
In Table 4, we report the SW growth regression separately for parlia-
mentary democracies and all other countries to investigate whether parlia-
mentary democracies respond di¤erently to the other explanatory variables,
or whether the di¤erence is primarily the growth e¤ects of resource abun-
dance. Table 4 shows that the estimated coe¢ cients on the initial income
level variable, the openness variable, the investment rate and the rule of law
index are within in the same range when comparing parliamentary regimes
to other countries. There is some deviation in the estimated e¤ect of the
growth in the external terms of trade. However, the main di¤erence is in
the estimated coe¢ cient for the measure of natural resource abundance.
We now consider electoral systems. Table 5 reports the same model
specication as in Tables 1 and 2, but compares di¤erent forms of electoral
system. Columns (1) and (3) show that di¤erences between electoral sys-
tems (majoritarian democracy, proportional democracy and no democracy)
do not matter decisively for growth (note that proportional electoral rule
is the excluded category). Majoritarian electoral systems perform better
than proportional electoral systems with natural resources. The estimated
interaction coe¢ cient is 5.56 and the t-statistic is 1.99. However, majoritar-
ian democracies remain adversely a¤ected by natural resources given that
the direct e¤ect exceeds the additional e¤ect of resource abundance, condi-
tional on being a majoritarian democracy. That is, the direct e¤ect of -9.36
and the interaction e¤ect of 5.56 combine to generate a negative e¤ect of -
3.80. The same pattern is conrmed by including only democracies. Among
democracies, majoritarian electoral systems perform better when there are
natural resources, with an estimated interaction coe¢ cient of 8.40, which is
signicant at the 0.9 percent signicance level. As shown in Table 6, includ-
ing controls for colonial rule and continental location does not change the
qualitative results from Table 7.
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Again we use LAD estimation and reweighted least squares to check the
e¤ect of outliers on the results (tables not shown). The quantile regression
results for the full sample indicate that there is no signicant di¤erence in
the growth e¤ect of resource abundance between di¤erent electoral systems.
Among democracies, the interaction e¤ect is statistically signicant (at 0.3
percent). The robust regressions conrm the pattern found in Table 5, but
the estimated interaction coe¢ cient (between majoritarian electoral systems
and resource abundance) is lower in magnitude and less signicant than the
OLS estimates.
Throughout the paper, the number of observations has been limited by
the rule of law index. One could argue that the 73 countries that do not
have missing values of the rule of law index in our main regressions are
not randomly selected, and that the statistical inference is limited to these
countries. In Table A2 (in the Appendix) we report versions of the main
regressions that include the average value of the Gastil Index rather than
the rule of law index.16 This gives us a total sample of 90 countries. As
shown by Table A2, replacing the rule of law variable with the average
value of the Gastil Index does not signicantly a¤ect the qualitative results
already obtained. In fact, the estimated interaction coe¢ cients are larger
in absolute value in the extended sample. This conrms that there are
statistically signicant di¤erences in the way di¤erent constitutions respond
to natural resources.
Our results support the primary idea behind the paper, which is that the
well-documented systematic e¤ects of constitutions on di¤erent measures of
economic policy may also extend to growth related policies (including mea-
sures of economic policy). However, can we interpret the estimates as re-
ecting a causal mechanism? This requires that the constitutional variables
are exogenous with respect to economic performance. Although barely any
reforms altering the PT (2003) classication of forms of government have
occurred, this might not be su¢ cient for exogeneity. To deal with poten-
tial endogeneity problems, whether they are due to reverse causality and/or
omitted variables, we apply an IV approach. As suggested by Persson (2005),
we assume that Western colonization a¤ects current policies, and thereby
growth, only through the form of political institutions. Evidence of greater
Western inuence is consistent with observing the same type of political
arrangements in former colonies as those observed in Western Europe; i.e.,
parliamentary democracies. Suppose, in line with Acemoglu et al., (2001),
that settler mortality is a good measure of Western inuence. Given the
validity of the identifying assumption that the inuence on current policies
operates only through the form of political institutions, settler mortality is
16The correlation coe¢ cient between the two variables is -0.72, which suggests that there
is a reasonably close relationship between democratic and institutional quality. Thus,
democratic quality may serve as a (weak) proxy for institutional quality, at least when
data on institutional quality is not available.
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a valid instrument for parliamentary democracy. To be consistent with the
rest of the paper, we dene a new dummy variable, non_parl. The non_parl
dummy is equal to unity if the country is classied as either a presidential
regime or a nondemocratic regime and is equal to zero if the country is clas-
sied as a parliamentary regime. We use settler mortality as an instrument
for non_parl . To implement this method we apply Wooldridges approach
to instrumentation of the endogenous interaction terms by rst predicting
non_parl from the following regression.17
non_parl = 0 + 1lsettler + Zi + ui: (2)
Then, we use the interaction term of the predicted variable and resource
abundance as an instrumental variable in the IV estimation. The results are
reported in Table A3. As expected a priori, the likelihood of parliamentary
democracy increases with Western inuence, i.e., with lower values of settler
mortality. Although there are data on settler mortality for only 44 coun-
tries in our main data set, the results from these 44 countries are similar
to the OLS estimates in column 3. The di¤erence between di¤erent forms
of government is no longer signicant, but the pattern is the same as that
implied by the OLS estimates. The direct e¤ect of initial resource abun-
dance is neither economically nor statistically signicant. As before, this
implies that parliamentary regimes seem free of the resource curse. With
only 44 countries, we have too few observations to further distinguish be-
tween democracies and nondemocratic regimes. Since the sample size is
limited by the rule of law variable, one way of expanding the sample would
be to use a di¤erent measure of institutional quality. SW (1997b) use an
institutional quality index that is related to, but di¤ers from, the rule of law
index. This index is an unweighted average of ve indexes based on data
from Political Risk Services and is available for a larger number of countries
than is the rule of law index. In columns (4) and (5) we report IV estimates
for democracies only, using the quality of institution variable rather than the
rule of law index. This provides a sample of 34 countries. In fact the esti-
mated interaction e¤ect is larger, when instrumented with settler mortality,
compared with the OLS estimates.
One concern, which applies to the empirical literature on economic growth
in general, is the basic concern of model specication. In particular, there
is a signicant degree of uncertainty attached to identifying which variables
are robustly related to growth.18 Among the most inuential contributions
addressing this question is Sala-i-Martin (1997). Sala-i-Martin choose a
total of 62 variables from the growth literature and test their correlation
17See Wooldridge (2002), Chapters 9 and 18.
18Levine and Renelt (1992) is the rst contribution in the growth literature that sys-
tematically adress this question. They do so by applying Leamers (1985) extreme-bounds
test to identify robust empirical relations in the growth literature.
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with the rate of economic growth. He choose three xed variables (i.e., the
variables that appear in all regressions) that are assumed to be "good" a
priori.19 These three variables include level of income in the beginning of
the period, life expectancy and the primary school enrollment rate. Sala-
i-Martin nds that 22 out of the remaining 59 tested variables appear to
be signicantly related to growth.20. The most "signicant" variables in-
clude: regional variables; political variables; religious variables; variables
describing market distortions and market performance; variables for types
of investment; primary sector production variables; openness; type of eco-
nomic organization; and former Spanish colonies. Table 7, 8 and 9 reports
the results when we include the variables that emerges as the most robust
correlates of growth according to Sala-i-Martin (1997).21 As reported in the
tables, we observe the exact same pattern as before, regarding the e¤ects
of natural resource abundance, constitutional forms and the interaction ef-
fects: on average there seems to be a resource curse; form of government
and electoral rule is not signicantly related to growth; presidential regimes
and regimes with a proportional electoral rule which are abundant in nat-
ural resources performs signicantly worse in the long run (1970-1990) than
their resource-abundant counterparts22.
Up to this point, we have investigated the heterogeneity in the long-
term e¤ects of resource abundance, by contrasting form of government and
electoral systems. Of course, each form of government is combined with
an electoral system. We now subdivide our constitutional classication into
four separate groups to combine electoral systems and form of government
(parl_maj, parl_prop, pres_maj, pres_prop) and interact them with re-
source abundance. The results are displayed in Table 10. Column (1) include
the SW (1997) controls whereas Column (2) include the Sala-i-Martin (1997)
controls. As seen from Table 10, the direct e¤ect of resource abundance is
not statistically signicant (the excluded category being parl_maj ).23 Re-
source abundant presidential democracies with proportional electoral sys-
tems do worse than their resource abundant counterparts. The estimated
e¤ect of the interaction term between pres_prop and resource abundance
19By this he mean that they have to be widely used in the literature, they have to be
variables evaluated in the beginning of the period to avoid endogenity, and they have to
be variables that are somewhat "robust" in the sense that they systematically seem to
matter in all regressions run in the previous literature (Sala-i-Martin, (1997).
20See Sala-iMartin (1997) for method and specication.
21The Sala-i-Martin (1997) data is available at http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/data.htm.
22Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) nd that the strongest evidence for growth is for the
relative price of investments, primary school enrollment and the initial level of GDP per
capita. Including the relative price of investment do not signicantly change our results.
23When the three constitutional dummies are included (but not their interactions with
resource abundance), the direct e¤ect of resource abundance ranges between -7.35 and
-3.70 (signicant at the 1% level with the SW(1997) controls, and signicant at the 10%
level with the Sala-i-Martin (1997) controls .
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ranges between -11.28 and -9.08 and is statistically signicant at the 5%
level.24
The nal concern that we address is that our ndings may rely on the
specic dataset, and in particular on whether the patterns are evident also
in more recent periods of growth. Tables 11-13 report the regression re-
sults of our main model specication for the growth period 1990-2000.25 We
nd evidence for the same patterns concerning the growth interactions of
constitutions and natural resources as in the 1970-1990 regressions. There
is no evidence of a resource curse in parliamentary regimes (Table 11, col-
umn 3) and in regimes with majoritarian elections (Table 12, column 2).
Presidential regimes and regimes with proportional electoral rules initially
endowed with abundant natural resources, on the other hand, experience
lower growth on average in the subsequent decade, 1990-2000. In the re-
gressions reported in Table 13 (column 2), we reproduce the results for the
1970-1990 sample (Table 10), that the worst combination of constitutional
regimes, when it comes to attracting the resource curse, is the combination
of a presidential form of government and a proportional electoral system.
5 Conclusion
The empirical results of this paper suggest that economieslong-run abilities
to deal with natural resource abundance depend largely on country specic
constitutional arrangements. We nd that the form of government seems
to matter more than being nondemocratic in relation to whether a country
is a­ icted by the so-called resource curse. Revisiting the seminal growth
analysis of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997a), we found that the resource curse
is explained by the poor performance of resource abundant presidential and
nondemocratic regimes  there is no resource curse in democracies with
a parliamentary form of government. This empirical nding is consistent
with recent contributions to the political economy literature, which sug-
gests that presidential regimes pursue inferior growth-promoting structural
policies compared with parliamentary regimes. Interestingly, constitutions
do not signicantly a¤ect growth directly, they simply have a negative in-
teraction with resource abundance. We tentatively interpret this result as
a budget constraint e¤ect  the negative growth dynamics of presidential
regimes, through inappropriate structural policies, seem to play a quantita-
tively signicant role only when governments face a less rigid budget con-
24As in the previous spesications, the constitutional dummies turn out statistically
insignicant when interaction terms between the constitutional variables and resource
abundance are not included.
25As the SW dataset does not contain many of the variables required in the 1990s
regressions, these had to be constructed. The data have been constructed in a similar way
as possible to the SW data, in order to compare all our results (see Data Appendix for
variable denitions).
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straints. We also nd patterns in the data that suggest that the electoral
system may matter for the resource curse. Proportional electoral systems
seem more likely to be a­ icted by the resource curse. However, these e¤ects
are empirically less robust than the e¤ects of the form of government.
Although the empirical evidence seems to be fairly robust, the underly-
ing mechanisms are still unclear and require future research. In particular,
theory should be developed to distinguish di¤erent potential interactions
between natural resource abundance and di¤erent dimensions of a countrys
political institution.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data appendix 1970-1990 sample
Using our denition of democracy we identify 58 countries as democracies.
Some of these countries are not classied according to their constitutional
form by PT (2003) or Persson (2005). These countries are Egypt, Morocco
and Nigeria. In order to classify these countries according to their form
of government we rely primarily on the SYSTEM variables in the World
Bank DPI data set. The SYSTEM variable classies countries as either
Parliamentary, Assembly-elected President or Presidential systems. Systems
with unelected executives, those scoring 2 or 3 on the Executive Index of
Political Competitiveness, are classied as presidential. The Executive Index
of Political Competitiveness scale is dened as follows:
1 if no legislature;
2 if unelected legislature;
3 if elected, one candidate;
4 if one party, multiple candidates;
5 if multiple parties are legal but only one party won seats;
6 if multiple parties did win seats but the largest party received more
than 75 percent of the seats;
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7 if largest party got less than 75 percent of the seats.
Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college
(whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there is no
prime minister, are also classied as presidential. In systems with both a
prime minister and a president, the following factors are used to categorize
the system:
a) Veto power: president can veto legislation and the parliament needs
a supermajority to override the veto;
b) Appoint prime minister: president can appoint and dismiss the prime
minister and/or other ministers;
c) Dissolve parliament: president can dissolve parliament and call for
new elections;
d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president more
often than the PM then this serves as an additional indicator to call the
system presidential;
The system is presidential if (a) is true, or if (b) and (c) are true. If
there is no information or ambiguous information on (a), (b), (c), then (d)
applies.
Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parlia-
mentary, with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot
easily recall the president (if it needs a two-thirds majority to impeach,
or must dissolve itself while forcing the president out) then the system is
classied as an assembly-elected presidential system.
Two of the countries not classied by PT (Morocco and Nigeria) are
classied as presidentialaccording to the SYSTEM variable, and we clas-
sify these countries as presidential (pres = 1) in our data, as this closely
corresponds to the denition used by PT. Egypt is categorized as having a
strong president elected by assemblyaccording to the SYSTEM variable.
Egypt is categorized as parliamentary (pres = 0) in our data set because
the assembly may recall the chief executive, either by a two-third majority
or by dissolving itself; thus the chief executive is subject to a condence
requirement.
We use the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (1997) to classify countries according to their electoral systems, and
use the same approach as PT (2003). According to this denition, Morocco
is classied as having a proportional electoral system (maj = 0), and Egypt
and Nigeria are classied as having majoritarian electoral systems (maj =
1).
7.2 Variable denitions, 1970-1990 Sample.26
africa
26Correspond to Table 1 through Table 10 and Table A1 through Table A3.
22
Geographic binary indicator for Africa. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
asiae
Geographic binary indicator for (East) Asia. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
avgastil7290
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights for the period
19721990, with each index measured on a 1 to 7 scale, which 1 represents
the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. Countries with combined
averages for political rights and civil liberties score between 1.0 and 2.5 are
classied as free; those scoring between 3.0 and 5.5 are partly free; and
those that score between 5.5 and 7.0 are not free. Source: Freedom House,
Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings.27
change in tot
Average annual growth in the log of the external terms of trade between
1970 and 1990. The external terms of trade is the ratio of an export price
index to an import price index. Source: SW (1997a).
civlibb
Index of civil liberties. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
col_esp, col_uk and col_oth
Binary indicators for British, Spanish and Other colonizers. Source:
Wacziarg (1996).
confuc
Fraction of Confucius. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
dem
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the average of indexes for civil
liberties and political rights for the period 19721990 is lower than 5 (cor-
responding to the denition partly freebased on ratings for 2003). Dem
= 1 if avgastil7290 < 5, and is 0 otherwise.
dem_maj
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if the country was clas-
sied as having a majoritarian electoral system in 1970 (conditional on the
country being a democracy), and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003); Pers-
son (2005); International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(1997).
dem_maj_ra
Interaction term between dem_maj and resource abundance (resource
abundance from SW, 1997a).
dem_parl
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 if the county was
non classied as a presidential regime in 1970 (conditional that the country
is classied as democracy), and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003), Shugart
and Carey (1992), World Bank DPI data set, and national sources.
dem_parl_ra
27For a precise denition, see <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/>
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Interaction term between dem_parl and resource abundance (resource
abundance from SW 1997a).
dem_pres
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 if the county was
classied as a presidential regime in 1970 (conditional on the country being
a democracy), and 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the condence of
the assembly is not necessary for the executive (even if an elected presi-
dent is not chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are classied
presidential regimes. Most semi-presidential and premier-presidential sys-
tems are classied as parliamentary. Source: PT (2003), Shugart and Carey
(1992), World Bank DPI data set, and national sources.
dem_pres_ra
Interaction term between dem_pres and resource abundance (resource
abundance from SW 1997a).
dem_prop
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if the country was clas-
sied as not having majoritarian electoral system in 1970 (conditional that
the country is classied as democracy), and 0 otherwise. Source: PT (2003),
Persson (2005), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (1997).
dem_prop_ra
Interaction term between dem_prop and resource abundance (resource
abundance from SW 1997a).
ecorg
Degree of capitalism. Index of degree in which economies favor capitalist
form of production. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
eqinv
Equipment investment. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
growth7090
Average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active
population between the 1970 and 1990. Source: SW (1997a).
initial income70
Natural log of real GDP divided by the economically-active population
in 1970. Source: SW (1997a)
institutional quality
An unweighted average of ve indexes based on data from Political Risk
Services. Source: SW (1997b).
invest7089
The logarithm of average investment to GDP ratio during the two decades.
Source: SW (1997a).
laam
Geographic binary indicator for Latin America. Source: Wacziarg (1996).
lifee
Life Expectancy 1960. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
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mining
Fraction of GDP in Mining. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
muslim
Fraction of Muslim. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
non_dem
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the average of the indexes for civil liberties
and political rights for the period 19721990 is higher than or equal to
5 (corresponding to the denition not free, based on ratings for 2003).
non_dem = 1 if avgastil7290 > 5, and 0 otherwise.
non_dem_ra
Interaction term between non_dem and resource abundance (resource
abundance from SW 1997a).
non _parl
Dummy variable for form of government, equal to 1 if the country is
classied as non democracy or a presidential democracy, and 0 if the country
is classied as a parliamentary democracy. Source: PT (2003), Shugart and
Carey (1992), World Bank DPI data set, and national sources.
openness
Openness variable measuring the fraction of years between 1970 and
1990 that the country was integrated in the global economy. A country is
integrated during a particular year if it maintained reasonably low tari¤s
and quotas, and did not have an excessively high black market exchange
rate premium. Source: SW (1997a).
prot
Fraction of Protestant. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
rerd
Exchange Rate Distortions. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
resource abundance70
Share of exports of primary products in GNI in 1970. Primary products
or natural resource exports are exports of fuels and non-fuel primary
productsfrom the World Data 1995 CD-ROM disk, produced by the World
Bank. Non-fuel primary products correspond to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4
and 68. Fuels correspond to SITC category 3. Source: SW (1997a).
rule of law
The variable reects the degree to which the citizens of a country are
willing to accept the established institutions to make and implements laws
and adjudicate disputes. Ranges from 0 (low) to 6 (high). Measured as of
1982. Source: SW (1997a).
safrica
Sub-Sahara African Dummy. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
spain
Dummy variable for former Spanish colonies. Source: Sala-i-Martin
(1997).
school Enrollment
25
Primary School Enrollment 1960. Source: Sala-i-Martin (1997).
settler mortality
Log of mortality rate among non-military settlers in Western European
colonies in the early 1800s. Source: Acemoglu et al. (2001).
7.3 Variable denitions, 1990-2000 Sample.28
GROWTH9000
Average annual growth in real GDP divided by the economically active
population between the 1990 and 2000. Exact calculation is
100*(1/10)*ln(GDPEA00/GDPEA90).
LGDPEA90
Natural log of real GDP divided by the economically-active population in
1990. The Real GDP data correspond to the series RGDPCH from the Penn
World Tables Version 6.1 (see Heston, Summers and Aten 2002), and are in
1996 Constant Prices. The economically active population is dened as the
number of people between the ages 15-64. The source for the population
data is World Development Indicators database. Since the World Bank
population data is given as percentage shares of total population, and the
real gdp data is given in per-capita terms, the actual calculation is
ln(RGDPCH90*(100/pop15-64)). Note: This is the same calculation as
SW (1997a).
LINVEST9099
Natural log of the ratio of real gross domestic investment to real GDP,
averaged over the period 1990-1999. Penn World Tables Version 6.1
MAJ
Dummy variable for electoral system, equal to 1 if all the lower house
in a country is elected under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. See PT (2003) for
denition.
MAJ_RA
Interaction term between MAJ and RESOURCE ABUNDANCE.
PARL_PROP
Dummy variable. (1-PRES )* (1-MAJ )
PRES
Dummy variable for forms of government, equal to 1 in presidential
regimes, 0 otherwise. See PT (2003) for denition.
PRES_MAJ
Dummy variable. PRES * MAJ.
PRES_PROP
Dummy variable. PRES *(1-MAJ )
PRES_RA
Interaction term between PRES and RESOURCE ABUNDANCE.
28Correspond to Table 11, through Table 13.
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RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80
Share of exports of primary products in GNI in 1980. Primary products
or natural resource exports are exports of fuels and non-fuel primary
productsfrom the World Data 1995 CD-ROM disk, produced by the World
Bank. Non-fuel primary products correspond to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 4
and 68. Fuels correspond to SITC category 3. Source: SW (1997a).
RULE OF LAW
Point estimate of "Rule of Law", the fth cluster of Kaufmann et al.
(2005) governance indicators, measured in 1996. The indicator measure the
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence. Ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 (higher values
correspond to better outcomes). Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005). The
data, as well as a web-based graphical interface, are available at:
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/. The Appendices and a
synthesis of the paper are available at:
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html.
YEARSOPEN
Index for openness to international trade in a country, complied by SW
(1995), measuring the fraction of years during 1950-1994 that the economy
in the country has been open. Ranges between 0 and 1. Source: PT (2003)
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7.4 Countries included in our data set, and their constitu-
tional classication
1970-1990 Data Set
Maj Prop
Pres Cyprus, Gambia, Nigeria, Pakistan
Philippines, U.S.A
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Columbia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras,
Korea Rep., Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,
Peru, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela
Parl
Australia, Bangladesh, Canada,
Egypt, France, India, Jamaica,
Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius,
New Zealand, Singapore,
Sri Lanka, Thailand,
Trinidad&Tobago, U.K
Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany West, Greece,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Senegal, Spain,
Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey,
Non Democracy
Algeria, Ghana, Benin, Indonesia, Burkina Faso, Iran, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Rep.
Ivory Coast, Chad, Chile, China, Jordan, Kenya, Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Gabon
Syria, Paraguay, Togo, Tunisia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda, South Africa, Zambia, Sudan, Zimbabwe
1990-2000 Data Set
Maj Prop
Pres
Chile, Gambia, Malawi, Pakistan,
Philippines, Uganda, USA, Zimbawe
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Columbia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Rep., Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Korea Rep., Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru,
Sri Lanka, Switzerland,
Uruguay, Venezuela
Parl
Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados,
Canada, Egypt, France, India,
Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Nepal,New Zealand, Thailand,
Trinidad&Tobago, U.K
Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey,
28
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Table 1: Growth 1970-1990 with form of government and interactions with
resource abundance. All countries included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -1.776 -1.79 -1.781
(0.206)*** (0.217)*** (0.209)***
resource abundance70 -8.167 -7.952 -2.836
(1.217)*** (1.246)*** (2.258)
openness 1.534 1.329 1.244
(0.388)*** (0.399)*** (0.389)***
invest7089 0.867 0.993 1.064
(0.316)*** (0.320)*** (0.309)***
rule of law 0.383 0.333 0.315
(0.103)*** (0.106)*** (0.108)***
change in tot 0.117 0.113 0.100
(0.045)** (0.047)** (0.045)**
dem_pres -0.57 0.131
(0.310)* (0.399)
non_dem -0.452 0.112
(0.370) (0.568)
dem_pres_ra -7.854
(2.925)***
non_dem_ra -6.205
(3.139)*
Constant 13.067 13.337 12.774
(1.590)*** (1.716)*** (1.663)***
Observations 73 73 73
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.73 0.76
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 2: Growth 1970-1990 with form of government and interactions with
resource abundance. Only democracies included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -1.922 -1.906 -1.87
(0.270)*** (0.264)*** (0.246)***
resource abundance70 -7.299 -7.214 -2.645
(1.635)*** (1.593)*** (2.199)
openness 1.475 1.186 1.123
(0.477)*** (0.490)** (0.458)**
invest7089 0.838 1.058 1.194
(0.416)** (0.421)** (0.396)***
rule of law 0.458 0.397 0.342
(0.135)*** (0.135)*** (0.128)**
change in tot 0.038 0.041 0.035
(0.072) (0.070) (0.065)
dem_pres -0.601 0.111
(0.319)* (0.390)
dem_pres_ra -8.022
(2.843)***
Constant 14.08 13.915 13.114
(2.109)*** (2.057)*** (1.941)***
Observations 55 55 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.74 0.77
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 3: Growth 1970-1990 with form of government and interactions with
resource abundance. Controlling for colonial power and continent.
All countries Democracies
initial income70 -1.527*** (0.262) -1.558*** (0.331)
resource abundance70 -2.533 (2.277) -2.754 (2.323)
openness 1.274*** (0.400) 1.138** (0.498)
invest7089 0.751** (0.320) 1.002** (0.443)
rule of law 0.368*** (0.104) 0.413*** (0.126)
change in tot 0.080 (0.050) 0.003 (0.077)
dem_pres 0.246 (0.432) 0.212 (0.442)
dem_pres_ra -6.947** (2.894) -6.569** (2.922)
non_dem 0.245 (0.548)
non_dem_ra -6.361** (3.072)
col_esp 0.401 (0.469) 0.330 (0.497)
col_uk 0.465 (1.034) 0.444 (0.858)
col_oth 1.034*** (0.288) 0.858** (0.326)
asiae 0.245 (0.503) 0.344 (0.580)
laam -0.188 (0.544) -0.094 (0.571)
africa 0.005 (0.712) 0.728 (0.878)
Constant 10.674*** (2.498) 10.073*** (3.115)
Observations 73 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.792 0.798
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 4: Growth 1970-1990. Parliamentary democracies and all other coun-
tries estimated separately.
Parliamentary dem. All other countries
(1) (2)
initial income70 -1.871 -1.830
(0.301)*** (0.268)***
resource abundance70 -3.586 -9.730
(2.215) (1.543)***
openness 1.267 1.218
(0.592)** (0.552)**
invest7089 1.121 0.938
(0.434)** (0.445)**
rule of law 0.300 0.341
(0.152)* (0.146)**
change in tot 0.323 0.102
(0.184)* (0.051)*
Constant 13.592 13.578
(2.338)*** (2.073)***
Observations 32 41
Adjusted R-squared 0.66 0.72
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 5: Growth 1970-1990 with electoral systems and interactions with
resource abundance.
All countries Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial income70 -1.785 -1.762 -1.907 -1.833
(0.224)*** (0.222)*** (0.275)*** (0.260)***
resource abundance70 -8.045 -9.360 -7.287 -9.958
(1.276)*** (1.796)*** (1.649)*** (1.832)***
openness 1.524 1.460 1.466 1.408
(0.394)*** (0.392)*** (0.482)*** (0.453)***
invest7089 0.886 0.790 0.870 0.736
(0.323)*** (0.322)** (0.427)** (0.403)*
rule of law 0.378 0.392 0.450 0.438
(0.106)*** (0.110)*** (0.137)*** (0.129)***
change in tot 0.119 0.120 0.038 0.015
(0.048)** (0.048)** (0.073) (0.069)
dem_maj 0.135 -0.395 0.116 -0.687
(0.279) (0.383) (0.284) (0.398)*
non_dem -0.039 -0.091
(0.338) (0.590)
dem_maj_ra 5.558 8.401
(2.787)* (3.086)***
non_dem_ra 0.519
(2.929)
Constant 13.065 13.270 13.842 13.938
(1.804)*** (1.777)*** (2.206)*** (2.070)***
Observations 73 73 55 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.73 0.72 0.75
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 6: Growth 1970-1990 with electoral system and interactions with re-
source abundance. Controlling for colonial power and continent.
All countries Democracies
initial income70 -1.466*** (0.268) -1.375*** (0.327)
resource abundance70 -8.225*** (1.758) -9.011*** (1.765)
openness 1.274*** (0.411) 1.263** (0.481)
invest7089 0.518 (0.329) 0.607 (0.418)
rule of law 0.451*** (0.103) 0.480*** (0.119)
change in tot 0.095* (0.051) -0.011 (0.075)
dem_maj -0.706* (0.375) -1.102*** (0.397)
dem_maj_ra 4.617* (2.708) 6.058** (2.880)
non_dem -0.134 (0.534)
non_dem_ra -0.700 (2.954)
col_esp 0.345 (0.465) 0.305 (0.472)
col_uk 0.661* (0.334) 0.876** (0.388)
col_oth 1.013*** (0.297) 0.713** (0.327)
asiae 0.471 (0.538) 0.774 (0.601)
laam -0.305 (0.537) -0.199 (0.531)
africa -0.019 (0.722) 0.920 (0.827)
Constant 10.905*** (2.612) 9.728*** (3.051)
Observations 73 55
Adjusted R-squared 0.783 0.809
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 7: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust signicant determi-
nants of growth according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). All countries included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -2.296*** -2.291*** -2.334***
resource abundance70 -4.591*** -4.570*** -0.569
lifee 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.085***
school enrollment 1.925* 1.895* 1.861*
safrica 0.077 0.228 -0.182
laam -0.361 -0.423 -0.731
civlibb -0.081 -0.003 -0.057
confuc 4.783*** 4.181** 3.988**
muslim 1.616*** 1.571*** 1.247**
rerd -0.002 -0.002 0.000
eqinv 15.083*** 15.485*** 18.746***
mining 3.685 4.082 3.888
sopen 1.652*** 1.684*** 1.422***
ecorg 0.085 0.086 0.053
spain 0.447 0.376 0.683
dem_pres 0.185 0.828
non_dem -0.274 0.382
dem_pres_ra -7.905*
non_dem_ra -5.956*
Constant 13.049*** 12.416*** 13.297***
Observations 73 73 73
Adjusted R-squared 0.746 0.741 0.753
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 8: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust signicant deter-
minants of growth according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Only democracies
included.
(1) (2) (3)
initial income70 -2.001*** -2.052*** -2.043***
resource abundance70 -3.915* -3.754* -1.332
lifee 0.055 0.062 0.051
school enrollment 2.439 2.247 2.572*
safrica 1.337* 1.465* 1.104
laam -0.008 -0.013 -0.236
civlibb -0.064 -0.076 -0.105
confuc 4.345** 4.100** 3.550**
muslim 1.625** 1.611** 1.514*
rerd -0.009 -0.010* 0.005
eqinv 17.038*** 18.236*** 20.354***
mining 2.316 2.453 1.751
sopen 2.195*** 2.271*** 2.114***
ecorg -0.117 -0.137 -0.262
spain 0.273 0.121 0.473
dem_pres 0.324 0.880*
dem_pres_ra -7.441*
Constant 12.963*** 13.227*** 13.475***
Observations 54 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.783 0.782 0.793
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
37
Table 9: Growth 1970-1990 including the most robust signicant determi-
nants of growth according to Sala-i-Martin (1997). Electoral Systems.
All Countries Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial income70 -2.286*** -2.272*** -2.030*** -1.966***
resource abundance70 -4.568*** -5.283* -3.858* -8.590***
lifee 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.054 0.045
school enrollment 1.884* 1.127 2.339 1.469
safrica 0.193 -0.145 1.363* 0.947
laam -0.418 -0.546 -0.058 -0.033
civlibb 0.011 -0.040 -0.055 -0.215
confuc 4.169** 4.489** 4.195** 4.611***
muslim 1.532*** 1.257** 1.501* 1.431*
rerd -0.002 -0.002 -0.010* -0.008
eqinv 15.081*** 17.611*** 17.300*** 21.067***
mining 4.351 4.528 3.177 0.737
sopen 1.656*** 1.455*** 2.168*** 1.989***
ecorg 0.095 0.096 -0.080 -0.195
spain 0.383 0.469 0.195 0.521
dem_maj -0.133 -0.527 -0.172 -0.809*
non_dem -0.464 -0.106
dem_maj_ra 4.469 9.334**
non_dem_ra -1.042
Constant 12.597*** 13.377*** 13.431*** 15.064***
Observations 73 73 54 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.740 0.744 0.779 0.798
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 10: Growth 1970-1990 combining form of government and electoral
system.
(1) (2)
resource abundance70 -1.834 -1.105
(2.691) (3.080)
parl_prop 0.354 0.595
(0.559) (0.545)
pres_maj 0.120 0.303
(0.849) (0.802)
pres_prop 0.340 1.415
(0.498) (0.646)**
parl_prop_ra -3.177 -7.118
(5.795) (5.729)
pres_maj_ra -11.791 -0.966
(9.349) (7.939)
pres_prop_ra -9.077 -11.285
(3.251)*** (5.375)**
Constant 13.439 14.482
(2.039)*** (3.218)***
Observations 55 54
Adjusted R-squared 0.758 0.786
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
Column (1) include the same controls as Table 1 (initial income70, openness,
invest7089, rule of law, and change in tot), whereas column (2) include the
same controls as Table 5 (initial income70, lifee, school enrollment, safrica,
laam, civlibb, confuc, muslim, rerd, eqinv, miningm, sopen, ecorg, and spain).
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 11: Growth 1990-2000. Form of Government. Only Democracies
included.
(1) (2) (3)
LGDPEA90 -0.905 -0.913 -1.031
(0.407)** (0.411)** (0.409)**
LINVEST9099 0.075 0.090 0.052
(0.586) (0.595) (0.584)
YEARSOPEN 0.279 0.258 0.319
(0.376) (0.391) (0.385)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE 80 0.183 0.188 2.913
(2.175) (2.194) (2.639)
RULE OF LAW 1.218 1.190 1.156
(0.390)*** (0.413)*** (0.405)***
PRES -0.116 0.847
(0.513) (0.742)
PRES_RA -8.014
(4.541)*
Constant 8.847 8.954 9.885
(3.678)** (3.740)** (3.706)**
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.120 0.154
Observations 61 61 61
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1990 and 2000 (GROWTH9000 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table 12: Growth 1990-2000. Electoral system. Only Democracies included.
(1) (2)
LGDPEA90 -0.855 -0.893
(0.435)* (0.428)**
LINVEST9099 0.104 0.126
(0.597) (0.587)
YEARSOPEN 0.259 0.375
(0.383) (0.383)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80 0.142 -3.821
(2.196) (1.113)
RULE OF LAW 1.174 1.113
(0.413)*** (0.408)***
MAJ 0.160 -0.828
(0.463) (0.739)
MAJ_RA 7.251
(4.270)*
Constant 8.283 9.050
(4.052)** (4.008)**
Adjusted R-squared 0.136 0.120
Observations 61 61
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1990 and 299 (GROWTH9000 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%..
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Table 13: Growth 1990-2000. Combinding Electoral system and form og
government. Only Democracies included.
(1) (2)
LGDPEA90 -1.005 -0.953
(0.473)** (0.499)*
LINVEST9099 -0.003 0.123
(0.620) (0.622)
YEARSOPEN 0.179 0.351
(0.405) (0.403)
RESOURCE ABUNDANCE80 -0.109 -2.910
(2.241) (3.195)
RULE OF LAW 1.355 1.130
(0.487)*** (0.507)**
PARL_PROP -0.451 -0.141
(0.594) (0.924)
PRES_MAJ -0.620 -0.983
(0.813) (1.324)
PRES_PROP -0.190 1.320
(0.643) (0.983)
PARL_PROP_RA -0.682
(6.355)
PRES_MAJ_RA 2.967
(8.550)
PRES_PROP_RA -10.911
(5.294)**
Constant 10.280 9.048
(4.465)** (4.736)*
Adjusted R-squared 0.101 0.142
Observations 61 61
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1990 and 299 (GROWTH9000 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table A1a. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 90 1.13 1.87 -3.64 5.77
initial income70 90 8.31 0.90 6.43 9.95
resource abundance70 90 0.13 0.10 0.01 0.54
openness 90 0.37 0.44 0.00 1.00
invest7089 90 2.66 0.70 0.31 3.58
rule of law 73 3.16 2.05 0.00 6.00
change in tot 90 -0.32 2.77 -6.46 7.97
Table A1b. Summary Statistics. Parliamentary Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 33 2.15 1.44 -1.35 5.77
initial income70 33 8.91 0.74 7.27 9.75
resource abundance70 33 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.37
openness 33 0.73 0.43 0.00 1.00
invest7089 33 2.97 0.57 1.14 3.58
rule of law 32 4.50 1.93 1.00 6.00
change in tot 33 -0.25 0.96 2.75 1.73
Table A1c. Summary Statistics. Presidential Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 25 0.57 1.90 -3.64 5.71
initial income70 25 8.81 0.71 7.17 9.95
resource abundance70 25 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.51
openness 25 0.27 0.36 0.00 1.00
invest7089 25 2.76 0.39 1.80 3.36
rule of law 23 2.39 1.76 0.00 6.00
change in tot 25 -0.71 2.69 -3.61 5.95
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Table A1d. Summary Statistics. Non Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 32 0.52 1.82 -2.40 4.56
initial income 32 7.62 0.68 6.43 9.16
resource abundance 32 0.16 0.11 0.02 0.54
openness 32 0.09 0.24 0.00 1.00
investment 32 2.25 0.83 0.31 3.34
rule of law 18 1.78 1.11 1.00 5.00
change in tot 32 -0.08 3.90 6.46 7.98
Table A1e. Summary Statistics. Maj. Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 22 1.84 1.56 -1.35 5.77
initial income70 22 8.55 0.93 7.17 9.95
resource abundance70 22 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.37
openness 22 0.55 0.46 0.00 1.00
invest7089 22 2.76 0.63 1.14 3.58
rule of law 19 3.68 2.24 1.00 6.00
change in tot 22 -0.55 1.97 -3.18 5.95
Table A1f Summary Statistics. Prop. Dem.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
growth7090 36 1.24 1.95 -3.64 5.77
initial income70 36 8.78 0.64 7.67 9.89
resource abundance70 36 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.51
openness 36 0.52 0.46 0.00 1.00
invest7089 36 2.95 0.40 1.63 3.52
rule of law 36 3.58 2.05 0.00 6.00
change in tot 36 -0.38 1.89 -3.61 5.37
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Table A2. Gastil index included rather than the rule of law index.
Form of government Electoral system
(1) (2) (3) (4)
initial income70 -1.465 -1.569 -1.384 -1.249
(0.227)*** (0.325)*** (0.234)*** (0.333)***
resource abundance70 -1.755 -1.884 -10.379 -11.640
(2.265) (2.267) (1.836)*** (1.925)***
openness 1.981 2.201 2.251 2.304
(0.369)*** (0.445)*** (0.353)*** (0.424)***
invest7089 1.383 1.143 1.269 1.016
(0.220)*** (0.401)*** (0.223)*** (0.397)**
avgastil7290 0.050 0.011 0.035 0.064
(0.142) (0.166) (0.142) (0.165)
change in tot 0.053 0.015 0.073 0.032
(0.044) (0.073) (0.045) (0.073)
non_dem -0.651 -0.883
(0.572) (0.573)
non_dem_ra -4.261 4.649
(2.937) (2.590)*
dem_pres 0.097 0.139
(0.438) (0.440)
dem_pres_ra -8.318 -8.413
(2.935)*** (2.934)***
dem_maj -0.222 -0.582
(0.391) (0.414)
dem_maj_ra 6.467 9.477
(2.423)*** (2.886)***
Constant 9.716 11.285 9.536 9.114
(2.219)*** (2.969)*** (2.306)*** (3.103)***
Observations 90 58 90 58
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.70
Dependent variable is average annual growth in real GDP divided by the
economically active population between 1970 and 1990 (growth7090 ).
See Section 7.2 (Variable Denitions) for a precise denition of variables.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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Table A3. Instrumental-variable approach.
All countries Democracies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Stage 2. Stage OLS 1. Stage 2. Stage OLS
Dep. var. Non_parl growth7090 growth7090 Non_parl growth7090 growth7090
lsettler 0.18 0.19
(0.08)** (0.10)*
ra70 -1.28 -2.81 0.90 -3.19
(6.03) (2.24) (4.97) (2.20)
non_parl: -1.69 0.11 -0.10 0.37
(2.03) (0.37) (1.91) (0.39)
non_parl_ra -6.36 -6.85 -10.12 -6.20
(7.40) (2.60)*** (5.93)* (2.75)**
Observations 44 44 73 34 34 57
Second stage (column 2) includes initial income70, resource abundance70,
invest7089, openness, rule of law and change in tot, in addition to the ones
shown in Table A3. First stage (column 1) includes the same exogenous
second-stage variables as column 2 and instrument as shown in column (1).
Second stage (column 5) includes initial income70, resource abundance70,
invest7089, openness, institutional quality and change in tot, in addition to
the ones shown in Table A3. First stage (column 4) includes the same exoge-
nous second-stage variables as column 5 and instrument as shown in column
(4). Column (3) and (6) represent the corresponding OLS regressions.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
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